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Introduction 
 
 Fiscal decentralization, the devolution of fiscal power and authority from the 
central to local governments, has been a fundamental aspect of China’s transition to a 
market economy, and it is quickly becoming one of the most researched areas in Chinese 
economics.  While most economists agree that fiscal decentralization has been beneficial 
to China’s economic growth as a transition economy, there has been growing concern 
about the possible detrimental effects of decentralization on other aspects of the Chinese 
economy (i.e. regional economic disparities, macroeconomic stability, and health care).      
Despite numerous publications on fiscal decentralization and several publications 
on health care in China, the existing literature fails to sufficiently address the effects of 
decentralization on health care.  For example, a study by the World Bank (1997) 
discussed the “profound repercussions” of fiscal decentralization on Chinese health care, 
yet it offered little empirical evidence to support this claim.  In my independent work, I 
empirically examine the effects of fiscal decentralization on health care in China by 
estimating a model that regresses health care variables against decentralization variables.   
From my analysis, I conclude that decentralization has not been detrimental to 
health care when health care performance is measured by the number of doctors per 
10,000 people, mortality rates, and local health care expenditure.  However, the effects of 
decentralization on health care are inconclusive when health care performance is 
measured by the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people.  
This paper is divided into five sections.  The first section discusses theories of 
federalism.  The second section presents an overview of China’s economic reforms since 
1980.  The third section discusses the current state of health care in China and its 
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supposed relationship to fiscal decentralization.  The fourth section discusses the data, the 
variables, and the model I use to measure the effects of decentralization on health care.  
The fifth section discusses the results of my empirical analysis.  
I.  First and Second Generation Theories of Federalism 
 Within the realm of federalism, two schools of thought explaining the economic 
benefits of decentralization have emerged.  First-generation theories, discussed in several 
works spanning the mid-1940s to the early 1970s, emphasize two main benefits of 
decentralization.  The first benefit, discussed by Hayek (1945), asserts that local 
governments are able to make better decisions than the national government about local 
conditions and preferences because they have better access to local information.  The 
second benefit, discussed by Tiebout (1956), maintains that competition among local 
governments “...allows citizens to sort themselves and match their preferences with a 
particular menu of local public goods.”1  Building on these preceding works, Musgrave 
(1959) and Oates (1972) propose that the appropriate assignment of expenditures and 
taxes to the various levels of government could increase welfare on both the local and 
national levels.2   
 Second-generation theories focus on government incentives and state-market 
relationships (Qian and Roland, 1998 and Qian and Weingast, 1997).  Specifically, these 
theories contend that governments have hidden agendas and are not benevolent, as the 
first-generation theories assume.  Thus, second-generation theories find that a strong 
relationship between local expenditures and local revenue can align the interests of local 
                                                          
1 Jin, Hehui, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast,  “Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: 
Federalism, Chinese Style,”  Stanford University (1999) 6.   
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governments to local economic prosperity.3  Furthermore, second-generation theories 
expand beyond the scope of first-generation theories by examining the effects of 
federalism on government behavior.  
 One of the key differences between first- and second-generation theories is their 
diametric perspectives on revenue transfers between the central and local governments.  
Although first-generation theories emphasize the benefits of fiscal decentralization, they 
also recognize a number of circumstances where decentralization leads to allocative 
distortions and a weakening of the central government’s fiscal capability.  Due to these 
concerns, first-generation theories do not find complete regional “self-financing” (i.e., the 
dependence of local governments on their own tax revenue collection for the financing of 
their expenditures) desirable.4 
 In contrast, second-generation theories find that the benefits of regional “self-
financing” outweigh the disadvantages of allocative distortions and a weakening of the 
central government’s fiscal capacity.  Linking the revenue collections of local 
governments with their expenditures and limiting the central government’s redistribution 
among local governments will provide a greater incentive to local governments to pursue 
market-oriented reforms.  These market-oriented reforms will increase the economic 
productivity of the locale, and the increase in local productivity will increase the revenue 
base of local governments.  Thus, placing fiscal responsibility into the hands of local 
governments proves to be economically beneficial, especially in a transition economy.     
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 Qian, Yingyi, and Barry R. Weingast,  “Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 11.4 (Fall 1997) 83. 
3 Jin, Hehui, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast, “Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: 
Federalism, Chinese Style,”  Stanford University (1999) 8.   
4 Ibid, 9. 
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II.  An Overview of Chinese Fiscal Decentralization 
 The Chinese fiscal administrative system consists of a central government and 
four subnational levels of government, which are referred to as “local governments.”  The 
local governments consist of:  
• 31 provincial-level localities: 22 provinces, four municipalities under the central 
government, and five autonomous regions. 
• Prefecture level: 335 prefectures and municipalities.  
• County level: 2166 counties and cities.   
• Township level: Several tens of thousands of townships, towns, and city districts. 
 Prior to 1980, China’s fiscal system was heavily centralized.  Profits and taxes 
from local governments were sent to the central government and then transferred back to 
provinces according to their expenditure needs.  Local governments did not have an 
active role in the economy.   
Since 1980, China has undergone a series of reforms that have given local 
governments more fiscal authority and incentives to develop local economies.  Local 
governments have more power in revenue collection, government expenditure, credit 
allocation, investment project proposal, price and wage control, foreign trade 
management, and industrial policy formation.5  Since reforms began in 1980, the 
intergovernmental relationship has gone through three main phases.  These phases are 
discussed below.   
In 1980, the centralized system became a revenue sharing system.  The system, 
called the contract responsibility system, divided revenues into three types: central-fixed 
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revenues (revenues accrued to the center), local-fixed revenues (revenues accrued to the 
localities), and shared revenues (revenues allocated between the center and localities 
according to an agreed set of rules).  From 1980-1984, approximately 80 percent of 
shared revenues were sent to the central government, and 20 percent were retained by the 
local governments.6 The local governments collected the majority of revenues.  The 
central government determined the bases and rates of all taxes. 
Due to growing regional economic disparities, the central government revised the 
contract responsibility system in 1985.  The revised version of the revenue sharing system 
set varying tax schedules that were based on the budget balances of local governments in 
the previous years.  The new system enabled financially weaker regions to retain more 
revenues or more subsidies and allowed the central government to maintain control over 
the richer regions (i.e., Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang) that 
contributed most to central revenue.  Although the reformed system effectively dealt with 
growing regional economic disparities, it reduced the richer regions’ incentive to expand 
their tax bases.  Thus, revenues collected by the richer regions grew more slowly than the 
national average from 1985-1988.    
 In 1988, the central government adopted a new system that utilized six types of 
central-provincial revenue-sharing methods.  Each method applied to a specific number 
of provinces.  The 1988 fiscal contract system further increased the revenue share 
retained by the localities, especially those that made significant contributions to the 
central government’s revenue.  This system lasted until late 1993.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 Ma, Jun, Intergovernmental Relations and Economic Management in China  (Great Britain: The Ipswich 
Book Company Ltd, 1997) 1.   
6 Ibid, 32. 
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 In 1994, the central government introduced a tax-assignment system.  Instead of 
allowing local governments to collect almost all the taxes, the central government set up 
its own tax collection agency, the National Tax Service, to collect both the central-fixed 
and shared taxes.  Local tax services would collect local-fixed taxes.  The reform 
addressed fiscal decline and macroeconomic instability worries by giving the central 
government control over a larger proportion of the total revenue.  
III.  Health Care in China 
 China has more than 200,000 health establishments and approximately 5.3 million 
health professionals, including 1.9 million doctors (about 1.6 doctors per 1,000 people). 
There are more than three million hospital beds, which is about 2.4 beds per 1,000 
people.7  In comparison, the United States has 2.4 doctors per 1,000 people and about 
3.85 beds per 1,000 people.8  China’s overall health status, as measured by life 
expectancy, and infant, child, and maternal mortality rates is excellent compared with 
other countries at similar income levels.  Health in China has improved immensely in the 
past 40 years.  Since 1960, the life expectancy rate at birth has increased from 55 to 69 
years.9  In the United States, the life expectancy at birth since 1960 has increased from 
69.7 to 75.2 years.10     
China’s gains in health care over the past four decades are declining according to 
the World Bank (1997).  The World Bank argues that decentralization has detrimentally 
affected Chinese health care in rural areas.  Prior to the economic reforms that began in 
                                                          
7 World Bank, Financing Health Care: Issues and Options for China, (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997)  
17. 
8 American Medical Association, Trends in U.S. Health Care 1992, (Chicago: American Medical 
Association) 41-42. 
9 World Bank, Tackling Health Transition in China, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999) 2. 
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1980, most rural areas had a cooperative medical system that reached most of the rural 
Chinese population.  Under this system, village authorities used funds from agricultural 
workers to hire health practitioners who took care of the villagers’ basic health needs.11  
Economic reforms since 1980 have eliminated agricultural collectives, consequently 
weakening the financial base of the cooperative medical system.  By 1985, fewer than 10 
percent of China’s villages maintained cooperative arrangements.  In 1993, about 7 
percent of China’s rural population were insured, down from 48 percent in 1981.12  
The World Bank also contends that fiscal decentralization hurt the viability of 
health care in China’s poorest regions.  In the pre-reform period, the pursuit of 
communist egalitarianism required that residents in all regions enjoy as equal a living 
standard as possible.  To achieve equitable living standards across regions, the Chinese 
government transferred a large share of income from richer and prospering regions to 
subsidize residents in more backward and more slowly growing regions. 13  Owing to 
government intervention in the form of regional income redistribution, residents in 
backward regions enjoyed a relatively high standard of living compared with the output 
level in those regions.  Due to decentralization, the central government has been less able 
to correct income inequalities between regions.  Since local governments control most of 
the spending on public health, the increase in regional income disparity has hampered 
health care in the poorest regions.  These areas, plagued with the worst public health 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 American Medical Association, Trends in U.S. Health Care 1992, (Chicago: American Medical 
Association) 5. 
11 World Bank, Financing Health Care: Issues and Options for China, (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997)  
24. 
12 World Bank, Financing Health Care: Issues and Options for China, (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997) 
15. 
13 Tian, Xiaowen.  “Market Orientation and Regional Economic Disparities in China,” Post-Communist 
Economies, 11.2, (1999)  167. 
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problems, now have the least capacity to develop and maintain public health programs.  
The health institutions in these areas must rely on user fees to generate revenues. 
IV.  Empirical Analysis 
Previous Work Relevant to My Research 
 Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999) measured the effects of decentralization on 
economic growth.14  Specifically, they estimated a model that regressed economic growth 
variables (i.e. GDP growth, growth of non-agricultural employment, growth of non-state 
industrial output, etc.) against variables that measured the degree of decentralization (i.e. 
fiscal decentralization, state industry decentralization, and bureaucratic distance).  They 
found that decentralization had a  positive and significant effect on provincial economic 
growth.      
The model I use to estimate the effects of decentralization on health care is a 
slight modification of the model used by Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999).  The model I 
estimate uses the same decentralization variables that were used by Jin, et al.  However, 
the model regresses health care variables, not economic growth variables, against the 
decentralization variables.  The following paragraphs describe the data, the variables, and 
the model I use.     
Data 
For my empirical work, I use a panel data set of 29 provinces from 1980 to 
1993.15  Unless otherwise noted, the data for the decentralization variables was obtained 
from Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999).  The data for the health care variables was obtained 
                                                          
14 Jin, Hehui, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast:  16-18.   
15 The data excludes Hainan and Guangdong since the data of Hainan was incorporated into Guangdong 
before 1988 and became separately listed after it obtained provincial status in 1988.   
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from China Regional Economy: A Profile of 17 Years of Reform and Opening-Up, which 
was published by the State Statistical Bureau.  
Variables for Decentralization 
Fiscal decentralization, the first variable, is the ratio of local government spending 
per capita to central government spending per capita.  The higher the ratio, the greater the 
degree of fiscal decentralization.  This is the standard measurement for fiscal 
decentralization commonly used in the literature.    
 Price subsidies were netted out from revenue and expenditure before 1986 but 
were included as revenue and expenditure after 1986, so they are excluded from the 
government expenditure data after 1986.  Since there is no explicit provincial data on 
price subsidy expenditures, the following method is used to estimate them.  The central 
and local share of price subsidies nationwide is used to calculate the total local 
expenditures of the price subsidies for each year.  Since price subsidies are only for urban 
residents, and they are provided uniformly across provinces, the provincial share of urban 
residency in the country is used to allocate price subsidies to each province.16   
  Although a ratio between local government spending per capita and central 
government spending per capita is the standard measurement for fiscal decentralization, it 
is somewhat difficult to interpret the fiscal decentralization coefficient in a regression.  
Therefore, I transform the fiscal decentralization variable into a variable where local 
government expenditure per capita is divided by total government expenditure per capita 
(local government expenditure per capita plus central government expenditure per capita).  
                                                          
16 Ibid, 17.  
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This second decentralization variable is called percent fiscal decentralization.  The higher 
the percentage, the greater the degree of fiscal decentralization.  
The data supplied by Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999) was missing fiscal 
decentralization values for the year 1993 in many provinces, and it was also missing a 
large number of fiscal decentralization values for the Hainan province.  I attempted to 
reconstruct their data set to include these missing values and used data from China 
Regional Economy: A Profile of 17 Years of Reform and Opening-Up.  Although I was 
unable to exactly replicate their data, the correlation between the reconstructed data set 
and their data set is approximately 0.98.  In addition to the fiscal decentralization and 
percent fiscal decentralization variables that are based on the Jin, Qian, and Weingast 
(1999) data, my analysis includes the variables reconstructed fiscal decentralization and 
reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization, which are based on the reconstructed data 
set.  
 Accounting for the characteristics of top provincial officials, the fifth variable 
used to measure decentralization is a transformed version of an index constructed by 
Huang (1996) that measures the bureaucratic distance between top provincial officials 
and the central government.  The index is based on the career background of the 
provincial Party Secretaries.  The score is 4 if the Party Secretary was promoted from 
within the same province; 3 if the Party Secretary was moved to the current post from 
another province; 2 if the Party Secretary served in the central government before his 
current appointment; and 1 if the Party Secretary concurrently holds a post in the central 
government.  From the index, the higher the score, the farther the top provincial officials 
are from the central government.  It is assumed that those provincial officials who have 
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higher scores in the index are more likely to have better local information and better local 
connections.  They should also be more committed to local prosperity. 
The sixth variable used to measure decentralization is state industry 
decentralization, which reflects the relative importance of the local government versus the 
central government in supervising the state owned enterprises within a province.  This 
variable is measured by the portion of industrial output from the state owned enterprises 
supervised by local governments in the total industrial output from all state owned 
enterprises in a province.  
Variables for Health Care Performance 
I use four variables to assess China’s health care sector.  The first variable is the 
number of doctors per 10,000 people in each province.  I assume that an increase in 
doctors per 10,000 people indicates an improvement in health care.   
The second variable is the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people in each 
province.  I assume that an increase in hospital beds per 10,000 people indicates an 
improvement in health care.  However, duplication problems within the Chinese health 
care system make the variable a questionable indicator of health care performance.  It is 
argued that an increase in hospital beds does not necessarily reflect actual gains in health 
care.  Yet, I believe including the variable in my analysis will be helpful in my assessment 
of the health care sector.    
The third variable is the provincial mortality rate.  The mortality rate measures the 
percentage of a province’s population that has died within a given year.  I assume that a 
decrease in the mortality rate indicates an improvement in health care.  However, the use 
of mortality rates in my analysis could lead to a specification problem because 
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decentralization does not directly affect mortality rates.  Rather, decentralization affects 
the quality of medical inputs, and a change in the quality of medical inputs affects 
mortality rates.  I take this specification problem into account when analyzing my results.  
The fourth variable is local health care expenditure.  Due to data limitations, the 
data I use for local health care expenditure is given in conjunction with local expenditure 
on education, science, and culture.  The values my model estimates for local health care 
expenditure are interpreted with the above fact in mind.   I assume that an increase in 
local health care expenditure indicates an improvement in health care.  
The Model 
I estimate the model: 
 Yit = αi + βt + δXit + uit 
In this equation, Yit, is a vector of variables that measures health care performance.  The 
αi  represent the constant for each province.  The βt denotes the annual dummies, which 
are meant to capture the effects of nationwide macroeconomic fluctuation.  Xit is a vector 
of variables measuring the degree of decentralization.  The uit’s are the disturbance terms.   
In my analysis, I estimate the decentralization variables individually and jointly. 
Random-Effects versus Fixed-Effects  
Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999) estimated their model using a fixed-effects 
approach.  However, the use of a fixed-effects approach in the estimation of my model 
may not be appropriate due to the use of different dependent variables.  The fixed-effects 
model indicates that there are significant provincial specific effects that, if not accounted 
for, could bias the estimates of the model.  A fixed-effects model accounts for provincial 
specific effects, implying that any correlation between the health care variables and the 
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decentralization variables cannot be attributed to inherent provincial characteristics.17  If 
there are no significant provincial specific effects that could bias the estimates of the 
model, then a random-effects model is appropriate.     
I estimate my model with a random-effects model and a fixed-effects model.  I 
then conduct a Hausman specification test to judge whether a random-effects or a fixed-
effects model would be more appropriate to estimate the model with.  The estimates of 
the decentralization variables are based on either a fixed-effects or random-effects model, 
depending on which model is indicated as appropriate.   
V.  Results 
 
Doctors per 10,000 People 
The random-effects model is appropriate in both the individual and joint models 
where doctors per 10,000 people is regressed against the decentralization variables.  The 
random-effects model specification suggests that the number of doctors per 10,000 people 
in a poor region is not significantly different from the number of doctors per 10,000 
people in a richer region.   
In the model where doctors per 10,000 people is regressed against fiscal 
decentralization, the coefficient for fiscal decentralization is 0.9967, and it is significant 
at the five percent level with a t-statistic of 2.908.  In the model where doctors per 10,000 
people is regressed against reconstructed fiscal decentralization, the coefficient for fiscal 
decentralization is not significant at the five percent level.  By including 1993 data and 
the data for the Hainan province, the significant positive effects of fiscal decentralization 
on the number of doctors per 10,000 people apparently disappears.            
                                                          
17 Ibid, 24. 
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In the model where doctors per 10,000 people is regressed against percent fiscal 
decentralization, the coefficient for percent fiscal decentralization is negative, but it is not 
significant at the five percent level.  In the model where doctors per 10,000 people is 
regressed against reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization, the coefficient for 
reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization is also negative, but it is not significant at the 
five percent level.       
In the model where doctors per 10,000 people is regressed against bureaucratic 
distance, the coefficient for bureaucratic distance is not significant at the five percent 
level.  The coefficient for state industry decentralization is also not significant at the five 
percent level in the model where doctors per 10,000 people is regressed against state 
industry decentralization.   
In the models where doctors per 10,000 people is regressed against fiscal 
decentralization (or reconstructed fiscal decentralization), state industry decentralization, 
and bureaucratic distance, the decentralization variables are not significant at the five 
percent level.  In the model where doctors per 10,000 people is regressed against percent 
fiscal decentralization (or reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization), state industry 
decentralization, and bureaucratic distance, the decentralization variables are not 
significant at the five percent level.     
Disregarding the fiscal decentralization coefficient (which was estimated with 
incomplete data), the results suggest that fiscal decentralization has not been detrimental 
to health care as measured by the number of doctors per 10,000 people.  
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Hospital Beds per 10,000 People 
 The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where hospital beds per 
10,000 people is regressed against the fiscal decentralization variable.  The coefficient for 
fiscal decentralization is positive with a coefficient of 2.966, and it is statistically 
significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of 7.231.  In the model where hospital 
beds per 10,000 people is regressed against the reconstructed fiscal decentralization 
variable, the fixed-effects model is appropriate.  The coefficient for the reconstructed 
fiscal decentralization variable is 4.493, and it is significant at the five percent level with 
a t-statistic of 5.500. 
 The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where hospital beds per 
10,000 people is regressed against percent fiscal decentralization.  The percent fiscal 
decentralization coefficient is negative and significant at the five percent level with a t-
statistic of -2.605.  For every one point increase in percent fiscal decentralization, the 
number of hospital beds per 10,000 people decreases by 11.139.  In the model where 
hospital beds per 10,000 people is regressed against reconstructed percent fiscal 
decentralization, the reconstructed fiscal decentralization coefficient is also negative, but 
it is not significant at the five percent level.  
In the model where hospital beds per 10,000 people is regressed against 
bureaucratic distance, the fixed-effects model is appropriate.  The positive coefficient for 
bureaucratic distance is not statistically significant at the five percent level.  The random-
effects model is appropriate in the model where hospital beds per 10,000 people is 
regressed against state industry decentralization.  The coefficient for state industry 
decentralization is not significant at the five percent level.   
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 The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where hospital beds per 
10,000 people is regressed against fiscal decentralization (or reconstructed fiscal 
decentralization), bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization.  The 
coefficient for fiscal decentralization is 2.378, and it is significant at the five percent level 
with a t-statistic of 5.076.  The coefficient for reconstructed fiscal decentralization is 
3.951, and it is significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of 3.986.  In both 
models, the coefficients for bureaucratic distance and state industry decentralization are 
not significant at the five percent level. 
 The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where hospital beds per 
10,000 people is regressed against percent fiscal decentralization (or reconstructed 
percent fiscal decentralization), bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization.  
The coefficient for percent fiscal decentralization is negative and significant at the five 
percent level with t-statistic of -2.270.  For every one point increase in percent fiscal 
decentralization, the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people decreases by 10.254.  The 
reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization coefficient is not significant at the five 
percent level.  In both models, bureaucratic integration and state industry decentralization 
are not significant at the five percent level.  
The highly insignificant estimates of bureaucratic integration and state industry 
decentralization suggest that these decentralization variables are not good variables to use 
in estimating the effects of decentralization on the number of hospital beds per 10,000 
people.  This implies that the primary factor determining the number of hospital beds in a 
region is economical and not political. 
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The effects of fiscal decentralization on the number of hospital beds per 10,000 
people are inconclusive.  When measured as a ratio, fiscal decentralization is found to 
have a positive and significant effect on the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people.  
However, when measured as a percentage, fiscal decentralization is found to have a 
negative effect on the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people.  These results give little 
insight into the effects of decentralization on health care when health care performance is 
measured by this variable.    
Mortality Rates 
 The random-effects model is appropriate in both the individual and joint models 
where the mortality rate is regressed against the decentralization variables.  In the model 
where the mortality rate is regressed against fiscal decentralization, the coefficient for 
fiscal decentralization is -0.2002, and it is significant at the five percent level with a t-
statistic of -2.105.  The reconstructed fiscal decentralization variable coefficient is -0.407, 
and it is also significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of -2.381.  
 In the model where the mortality rate is regressed against percent fiscal 
decentralization, the coefficient for percent fiscal decentralization is negative and 
significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of –2.936.  For every one point 
increase in percent fiscal decentralization, the mortality rate decreases by 2.344 
percentage points.  In the model where the mortality rate is regressed against 
reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization, the coefficient for percent fiscal 
decentralization is negative and significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of  
-2.598.  For every one point increase in percent fiscal decentralization, the mortality rate 
decreases by 1.809 percentage points.   
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In the model where the mortality rate is regressed against bureaucratic distance, 
the coefficient for bureaucratic distance is not significant at the five percent level.  In the 
model where the mortality rate is regressed against state industry decentralization, the 
coefficient for state industry decentralization is not significant at the five percent level.   
In the model where the mortality rate is regressed against fiscal decentralization 
(or reconstructed fiscal decentralization), bureaucratic distance, and state industry 
decentralization, the coefficients for fiscal decentralization (or reconstructed fiscal 
decentralization) are negative and significant.  The coefficient for fiscal decentralization 
is -0.2299 and has a t-statistic of -2.243.  The coefficient for the reconstructed fiscal 
decentralization is -0.6292 and has a t-statistic of -3.305.  Bureaucratic distance and state 
industry decentralization are not statistically significant.   
In the models where the mortality rate is regressed against percent fiscal 
decentralization (or reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization), bureaucratic distance, 
and state industry decentralization, the coefficients for percent fiscal decentralization (or 
reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization) are negative and significant.  The coefficient 
for percent fiscal decentralization is -3.610 and has a t-statistic of -4.260.  The coefficient 
for reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization is -3.429 and has a t-statistic of -4.376.  
Bureaucratic distance and state industry decentralization are not statistically significant.   
The negative and significant relationship between fiscal decentralization, 
measured as a ratio and as a percentage, and the mortality rate suggests that 
decentralization has not been detrimental to the mortality rate.  Health care has improved, 
and this improvement has been realized in lower provincial mortality rates.  Furthermore, 
the specification of a random-effects model implies that the mortality rates in the 
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provinces are not specific provincial characteristics – the mortality rates in poorer regions 
are not inherently different from the mortality rates in the richer provinces.  If health care 
were worse in the poorer provinces, and this situation caused higher mortality rates, a 
fixed-effects model would be needed to estimate the models because the mortality rates in 
the poorer regions would be biased upward while the mortality rates in the richer regions 
would be biased downward.           
 Local Health Care Expenditure 
 The data on local health care expenditure is taken from the category “Local 
Expenditure on Science, Education, Culture, and Health Care.”  China Regional 
Economy: A Profile of 17 Years of Reform and Opening-Up did not specify how the 
money was allocated among the four groups.  Although it is possible that local health care 
expenditures have decreased over time while expenditures in the other three groups have 
increased substantially, the possibility of such a scenario is unlikely.  In my analysis, I 
assume that local health care expenditure has a constant percent share of the category’s 
expenditure.  
The random-effects model is appropriate in the model where local expenditure on 
science, education, culture, and health care expenditure is regressed against fiscal 
decentralization.  The coefficient for fiscal decentralization is not significant at the five 
percent level.  The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where local 
expenditure on science, education, culture, and health care is regressed against the 
reconstructed fiscal decentralization variable.  The coefficient is 11.685, and it is 
significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of 6.409.  
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The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where local expenditure on 
science, education, culture, and health care expenditure is regressed against percent fiscal 
decentralization (or reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization).  The coefficient for 
percent fiscal decentralization variable is 81.78, and it is significant at the five percent 
level with a t-statistic of 13.607.  The coefficient for reconstructed percent fiscal 
decentralization is 71.416, and it is significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of 
9.724.  
 The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where local expenditure on 
science, education, culture and health care is regressed against bureaucratic distance.  The 
coefficient for bureaucratic distance is 0.644, and it is significant at the five percent level 
with a t-statistic of 2.082. 
 The random-effects model is appropriate in the model where local expenditure on 
science, education, culture, and health care is regressed against state industry 
decentralization.  The coefficient for state industry decentralization is not significant at 
the five percent level.   
The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where local expenditure on 
science, education, culture, and health care is regressed against fiscal decentralization (or 
reconstructed fiscal decentralization), state industry decentralization, and bureaucratic 
distance.  The coefficient for fiscal decentralization is 3.941 and it is significant at the 
five percent level with a t-statistic of 4.485.  The reconstructed fiscal decentralization 
coefficient is 11.536, and it is significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of 
6.559.  State industry decentralization and bureaucratic distance are not statistically 
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significant.  However, bureaucratic distance is positive and significant at the ten percent 
level.   
These results suggest that fiscal decentralization, measured as a ratio and as a 
percentage, and  bureaucratic distance have been beneficial to local expenditure on health 
care.  Political and economic factors have a significant role in determining local 
expenditure on science, education, culture, and health care.  
Although local health care expenditure is shown to have a positive and significant 
correlation with decentralization, the increase in local health care expenditure may not 
necessarily reflect an improvement in local health care.  Local health care expenditures 
could have increased marginally compared to the substantial decrease in central 
government allocations for health care expenditures.  Since the more destitute provinces 
relied heavily on the central government as a source of funding, a decrease in central 
government funds could have worsened their health care.  Yet, the worsened state of 
health care would fail to be reflected by the marginal increases in local health care 
expenditure.  However, such an unfortunate state of health care in the poorer provinces 
seems unlikely given the results of the doctors per 10,000 people regressions and the 
mortality rate regressions.        
Conclusion 
In my junior independent work, I attempt to determine whether or not fiscal 
decentralization has been detrimental to health care in China by estimating a model in 
which health care performance variables are regressed against decentralization variables.    
I conclude that fiscal decentralization has been beneficial to health care when 
health care performance is measured by mortality rates and local expenditure on health 
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care.  Fiscal decentralization, reconstructed fiscal decentralization, percent fiscal 
decentralization, and reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization are shown to have a 
negative and significant relationship with mortality rates.  Fiscal decentralization, 
reconstructed fiscal decentralization, percent fiscal decentralization, reconstructed percent 
fiscal decentralization, and bureaucratic distance have a positive and significant effect on 
local health care expenditure.  
When health care performance is measured by doctors per 10,000 people, the 
results suggest that decentralization has not detrimentally affected health care.  The 
coefficient for fiscal decentralization suggests that fiscal decentralization has been 
beneficial to doctors per 10,000 people.  However, the fiscal decentralization data was 
missing several values from 1993 and the Hainan province, so the reconstructed fiscal 
decentralization coefficient and the reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization 
coefficients are probably more reliable coefficients.  These coefficients imply that 
decentralization has not significantly affected the number of doctors per 10,000 people.  
The effects of decentralization on the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people 
are inconclusive.  The fiscal decentralization and reconstructed fiscal decentralization 
coefficients indicate that fiscal decentralization, when measured as a ratio, has been 
beneficial to hospital beds per 10,000 people.  Yet, the percent fiscal decentralization and 
the reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization coefficients suggest that fiscal 
decentralization has been detrimental to the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people.    
Bureaucratic distance and state industry decentralization are not very good 
decentralization variables to use in measuring the effects of decentralization on health 
care.  The results of the analysis suggest that health care performance is more closely 
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related to the financial, rather than the political, aspects of decentralization.  The 
relationship between local government expenditure and central government expenditure 
is the primary force that affects health care performance, and the more political aspects of 
decentralization, measured by bureaucratic distance and state industry decentralization, 
are not as relevant.  
Although my findings are not completely conclusive, they strongly suggest that 
fiscal decentralization has not been detrimental to health care in China.  Fiscal 
decentralization has been beneficial to the health care sector in terms of decreasing the 
mortality rates and increasing local government expenditure on health care, and it has not 
been detrimental to the number of doctors per 10,000 people in a province.  My research 
hopefully adds a new and more empirical perspective to the existing literature concerning 
fiscal decentralization and health care.    
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics of Variables 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Decentralization     
Fiscal Decentralization 1.475 0.397 4.785 0.932 
Reconstructed Fiscal Decentralization 0.797 0.263 2.549 0.479 
Percent Fiscal Decentralization 0.549 0.284 0.827 0.132 
Reconstructed Percent Fiscal 
Decentralization 
0.412 0.208 0.718 0.125 
Bureaucratic Distance 1.777 1 4 0.849 
State Industry Decentralization 0.751 0.095 0.997 0.126 
     
Health Care     
Doctors per 10,000 People 22.022 7.4 134.8 21.461 
Hospital Beds per 10,000 People 25.190 13.3 59.3 9.091 
Mortality Rate (%) 6.234 3.8 9.88 0.960 
Local Health Care Expenditure 13.487 0.76 95.38 11.025 
(100 million yuan)     
The data spans 1980-1993.  Unless otherwise noted, the data was obtained from China Regional 
Economy: A Profile of 17 Years of Reform and Opening-Up 
 
Fiscal Decentralization is the ratio of local government expenditure per capita to central 
government expenditure per capita.  The data for this variable was obtained from Jin, Qian, and 
Weingast (1999). 
 
Percent Fiscal Decentralization is a transformation of the fiscal decentralization variable.  The 
variable is local government expenditure per capita divided by the total government expenditure 
per capita (local government expenditure per capita plus central government expenditure per 
capita).  The data for this variable was obtained from Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999).    
 
The fiscal decentralization data obtained from Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999) was missing many 
values from 1993 and from the Hainan province.  I reconstructed their fiscal decentralization data 
and included these missing values.  Although the exact numbers differ, the correlation between 
the two fiscal decentralization data sets is 0.98.  The reconstructed variables are based on the 
reconstructed data set, and they are calculated in the same way as the fiscal decentralization and 
percent fiscal decentralization variables.   
 
Bureaucratic Distance is an index that accounts for the characteristics of top provincial officials.  
The score is 4 if the Party Secretary was promoted with the same province; 3 if the Party 
Secretary was moved to the current post from another province; 2 if the Party Secretary served in 
the central government before his current appointment; and 1 if the Party Secretary concurrently 
holds a post in the central government.  The data was obtained from Huang (1996). 
 
State Industry Decentralization is measured by the portion of industrial output from the state 
owned enterprises supervised by local government in the total industrial output from all state 
owned enterprises in a province.   
 
Local Health Care Expenditure is Local Expenditure on Science, Education, Culture, and Health 
Care.     
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Table 2.  The Effects of Fiscal Decentralization on Health Care Performance 
 Fiscal Decentralization Reconstructed Fiscal Decentralization 
Doctors per 10,000 People 0.997 0.881 
 (2.908) (1.260) 
   
Hospital Beds per 10,000 People 2.966 4.493 
 (7.231) (5.500) 
   
Mortality Rates -0.2002 -0.4065 
 (-2.105) (-2.381) 
   
Local Health Care Expenditure 0.6291 11.685 
 (0.947) (6.409) 
** t-statistics are in parentheses 
 
Each regression was done with both a fixed-effects and random-effects model.  The Hausman 
specification test was used to determine which model better suited the data.  The better-suited 
model estimates appear in the columns. 
 
Each regression includes a full set of provincial dummies and year dummies.   
 
The Fiscal Decentralization column lists the fiscal decentralization coefficients when each health 
care variable is regressed against the fiscal decentralization variable.  
 
The Reconstructed Fiscal Decentralization column lists the reconstructed fiscal decentralization 
coefficients when each health care variable is regressed against the reconstructed fiscal 
decentralization variable.  
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Table 3.  The Effects of Percent Fiscal Decentralization on Health Care Performance 
 Percent Fiscal 
Decentralization 
Reconstructed Percent Fiscal 
Decentralization 
Doctors per 10,000 People -5.445 -3.997 
 (-1.644) (-1.336) 
   
Hospital Beds per 10,000 People -11.139 -6.702 
 (-2.605) (-1.815) 
   
Mortality Rates -2.345 -1.809 
 (-2.936) (-2.598) 
   
Local Health Care Expenditure 81.781 71.416 
 (13.607) (9.724) 
** t-statistics in parentheses 
 
Each regression was done with both a fixed-effects and random-effects model.  The Hausman 
specification test was used to determine which model better suited the data.  The better-suited 
model estimates appear in the columns. 
 
Each regression includes a full set of provincial dummies and year dummies.   
 
The Percent Fiscal Decentralization column lists the percent fiscal decentralization coefficients 
when each health care variable is regressed against the percent fiscal decentralization variable.  
 
The Reconstructed Percent Fiscal Decentralization column lists the reconstructed fiscal 
decentralization coefficients when each health care variable is regressed against the 
reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization variable.  
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Table 4.  The Effects of Bureaucratic Distance or State Industry Decentralization on Health    
Care Performance 
 Bureaucratic Distance State Industry Decentralization 
Doctors per 10,000 People 0.0490 0.3643 
 (0.364) (0.207) 
   
Hospital Beds per 10,000 People 0.2731 0.0871 
 (1.552) (0.043) 
   
Mortality Rates 0.0427 0.3977 
 (0.938) (0.819) 
   
Local Health Care Expenditure 0.6438 -2.3800 
 (2.082) (-0.526) 
** t-statistics in parentheses 
 
Each regression was done with both a fixed-effects and random-effects model.  The Hausman 
specification test was used to determine which model better suited the data.  The better-suited 
model estimates appear in the columns. 
 
Each regression includes a full set of provincial dummies and year dummies.   
 
The Bureaucratic Distance column lists the bureaucratic distance coefficients when each health 
care variable is regressed against the bureaucratic distance variable.   
 
The State Industry Decentralization column lists the state industry decentralization coefficients 
when each health care variable is regressed against the state industry decentralization variable.  
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Table 5.  The Effects of Fiscal Decentralization, Bureaucratic Distance, and State Industry 
Decentralization on Health Care Performance 
 Fiscal 
Decentralization 
Bureaucratic 
Distance 
State Industry 
Decentralization 
Doctors per 10,000 People  0.5545 -0.0615 0.4122 
 (1.390) (-0.407) (0.255) 
    
Hospital Beds per 10,000 People 2.3780 0.0363 1.3290 
 (5.076) (0.203) (0.697) 
    
Mortality Rates -0.2299 0.0579 0.4175 
 (-2.243) (1.160) (0.842) 
    
Local Health Care Expenditure 3.9409 0.5641 -0.9318 
 (4.485) (1.697) (-0.263) 
** t-statistics in parentheses 
 
Each regression was done with both a fixed-effects and random-effects model.  The Hausman 
specification test was used to determine which model better suited the data.  The better-suited 
model estimates appear in the columns. 
 
Each regression includes a full set of provincial dummies and year dummies.   
 
The Fiscal Decentralization column gives the coefficients for fiscal decentralization when each 
health care variable is regressed against the fiscal decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and 
state industry decentralization variables.   
 
The Bureaucratic Distance column gives the coefficients for bureaucratic distance when each 
health care variable is regressed against the fiscal decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and 
state industry decentralization variables.   
 
The State Industry Decentralization column gives the coefficients for state industry 
decentralization when each health care variable is regressed against the fiscal decentralization, 
bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization variables.   
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Table 6.  The Effects of Reconstructed Fiscal Decentralization, Bureaucratic 
Distance, and State Industry Decentralization on Health Care Performance 
 Reconstructed Fiscal 
Decentralization 
Bureaucratic 
Distance 
State Industry 
Decentralization 
Doctors per 10,000 People  1.1833 -0.0696 0.2967 
 (1.432) (-0.460) (0.182) 
    
Hospital Beds per 10,000 People 3.9508 0.0061 0.5346 
 (3.986) (0.034) (0.272) 
    
Mortality Rates -0.6292 0.0556 0.2479 
 (-3.305) (1.118) (0.507) 
    
Local Health Care Expenditure 11.5359 0.5048 -0.8023 
 (6.559) (1.572) (-0.231) 
** t-statistics in parentheses 
 
Each regression was done with both a fixed-effects and random-effects model.  The Hausman 
specification test was used to determine which model better suited the data.  The better-suited 
model estimates appear in the columns. 
 
Each regression includes a full set of provincial dummies and year dummies.   
 
The Reconstructed Fiscal Decentralization column gives the coefficients for reconstructed fiscal 
decentralization when each health care variable is regressed against the reconstructed fiscal 
decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization variables.   
 
The Bureaucratic Distance column gives the coefficients for bureaucratic distance when each 
health care variable is regressed against the reconstructed fiscal decentralization, bureaucratic 
distance, and state industry decentralization variables.   
 
The State Industry Decentralization column gives the coefficients for state industry 
decentralization when each health care variable is regressed against the reconstructed fiscal 
decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization variables.   
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Table 7.  The Effects of Percent Fiscal Decentralization, Bureaucratic Distance, and State 
Industry Decentralization on Health Care Performance 
 Percent Fiscal 
Decentralization 
Bureaucratic 
Distance 
State Industry 
Decentralization 
Doctors per 10,000 People  -2.8703 -0.0576 0.0099 
 (-0.783) (-0.380) (0.006) 
    
Hospital Beds per 10,000 People -10.2543 0.0372 -0.1520 
 (-2.270) (0.200) (-0.077) 
    
Mortality Rates -3.6097 0.06299 0.3706 
 (-4.260) (1.290) (0.764) 
    
Local Health Care Expenditure 85.7838 0.4882 1.3933 
 (13.116) (1.813) (0.485) 
** t-statistics in parentheses 
 
Each regression was done with both a fixed-effects and random-effects model.  The Hausman 
specification test was used to determine which model better suited the data.  The better-suited 
model estimates appear in the columns. 
 
Each regression includes a full set of provincial dummies and year dummies.   
 
The Percent Fiscal Decentralization column gives the coefficients for percent fiscal 
decentralization when each health care variable is regressed against the percent fiscal 
decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization variables.   
 
The Bureaucratic Distance column gives the coefficients for bureaucratic distance when each 
health care variable is regressed against the percent fiscal decentralization, bureaucratic distance, 
and state industry decentralization variables.   
 
The State Industry Decentralization column gives the coefficients for state industry 
decentralization when each health care variable is regressed against the percent fiscal 
decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization variables.   
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Table 8.  The Effects of Reconstructed Percent Fiscal Decentralization, Bureaucratic 
Distance, and State Industry Decentralization on Health Care Performance 
 Reconstructed Percent 
Fiscal Decentralization 
Bureaucratic 
Distance 
State Industry 
Decentralization 
Doctors per 10,000 People  1.2924 -0.0668 0.1441 
 (0.342) (-0.440) (0.088) 
    
Hospital Beds per 10,000 People -1.8171 0.0179 -0.0518 
 (-0.387) (0.096) (-0.026) 
    
Mortality Rates -3.4294 0.0585 0.2325 
 (-4.376) (1.192) (0.483) 
    
Local Health Care Expenditure 85.3697 0.04010 -0.2010 
 (12.368) (1.451) (-0.067) 
** t-statistics in parentheses 
 
Each regression was done with both a fixed-effects and random-effects model.  The Hausman 
specification test was used to determine which model better suited the data.  The better-suited 
model estimates appear in the columns. 
 
Each regression includes a full set of provincial dummies and year dummies.   
 
The Reconstructed Percent Fiscal Decentralization column gives the coefficients for 
reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization when each health care variable is regressed against 
the percent fiscal decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization 
variables.   
 
The Bureaucratic Distance column gives the coefficients for bureaucratic distance when each 
health care variable is regressed against the reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization, 
bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization variables.   
 
The State Industry Decentralization column gives the coefficients for state industry 
decentralization when each health care variable is regressed against the reconstructed percent 
fiscal decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization variables. 
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